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Abstract—Most of the data manipulation attacks on deep
neural networks (DNNs) during the training stage introduce a
perceptible noise that can be catered by preprocessing during
inference. Therefore, data poisoning attacks during inference
(e.g., adversarial attacks) are becoming more popular. How-
ever, they do not consider the imperceptibility factor in their
optimization algorithms, and can be detected by correlation
and structural testing. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a
novel methodology which automatically generates imperceptible
attack images by using the back-propagation algorithm on pre-
trained DNNs. We present a case study on traffic sign detection
using the VGGNet and the German Traffic Sign Recognition
Benchmarks dataset in an autonomous driving use case. Our
results demonstrate that the generated attack images successfully
perform misclassification while remaining imperceptible in both
“subjective” and “objective” quality tests.
Index Terms—Machine Learning, Deep Neural Network,
DNNs, Data Poisoning Attacks, Imperceptible Attack Noise, ML
Security
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development in technologies for smart cyber-
physical systems is playing a vital role in the emergence of
autonomous vehicles. For example, the number of autonomous
vehicles in US, China and Europe is increasing exponentially,
as shown in Fig. 1 and is estimated to reach approximately 80
Million by 2030 [1] [2]. However, the amount of data gener-
ated by the multiple sensors node, e.g., LiDAR, Navigation,
camera, radar, and other sensors, is massive (4 terabytes per
day, see Fig. 1). Therefore, to efficiently handle this amount of
data, the following research challenges need to be addressed:
1) How to increase the computing capability to process the
large amounts of generated data with minimum energy
consumption?
2) How to increase the storing capability in order to store this
large amount of data in interpretable form while meeting
defined energy constraints?
Therefore, there is a dire need to develop the computing archi-
tectures, methodologies, frameworks, algorithms and tools for
processing/handling the data in autonomous vehicles. Machine
learning (ML) algorithms, especially deep neural networks
(DNNs), serve as a prime solution because of their ability
to effectively process the big data to solve tough problems in
recognition, mining and synthesis applications [3]. DNNs in
autonomous vehicles not only address the huge data processing
requirements but they have also revolutionized several aspects
How to efficiently and securely
process, acquire and store this 
enormous amount of data?
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Fig. 1: Increasing trend of automation in self-driving cars; The
expected amount of data that will be generated per day in autonomous
vehicles [1].
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Fig. 2: An overview of security threats/attacks and their respective
payloads for machine Learning algorithms during training and
inference.
of autonomous vehicles [4], e.g., obstacle detection, traffic sign
detection, etc.
A. Security Threats in DNN modules
Since several key aspects, i.e., collision avoidance, traffic
sign detection, navigation with path following, are based on
Machine Learning (ML) [4]. Therefore, these aspects are
vulnerable to several security threats, as shown in Fig. 2,
which are due to the unpredictability of the computations in the
hidden layers of these DNN-based algorithms [5]. As a result,
autonomous vehicles are becoming more vulnerable to several
security threats [6]. For instance, misclassification in object
detection or traffic sign detection may lead to catastrophic
incidents [7], [8]. Fig. 3 shows two scenarios where an attacker
can target a traffic sign misclassification.
Unlike the traditional systems, the manufacturing cycle of
the DNNs is based on three stages, training, hardware imple-
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imperceptible noise during the inferencing.
Fig. 3: Attack scenarios and corresponding threat models; In both scenarios, an attacker is adding an attack noise in the inference data.
However, the noise is visible in scenario II but in scenario III the attack noise is not visible.
mentation, and inference in real-time. Each stage possesses its
own security vulnerabilities [6], such as data manipulation and
corresponding payloads (i.e., confidence reduction, defined
as an ambiguity in classification, and random or targeted
misclassification) [3], [9], as shown in Fig. 2. For example,
during the training stage [10], [11], dataset [12], tools and
architecture/model are vulnerable to security attacks, such
as adding parallel layers or neurons [13], [14], to perform
security attacks [15], [16]. Similarly, during the hardware
implementation and inference stages, computational hardware
and real-time dataset can be exploited to perform security
attacks [17], [18].
In the context of autonomous vehicles, data poisoning is one
of the most commonly used attack on ML-modules. Typically,
these attacks can be performed in two different ways:
1) Training Data Poisoning (TDP): This attack introduces
small patterned noise in training data samples to train the
network for that particular noise pattern [19]. However, for
successful execution, the attacker requires complete access
to the training dataset and inference data acquisition blocks.
Moreover, for most of these techniques, the noise pattern
is visible and can be removed by inspection.
2) Inference Data Poisoning (IDP): This attack exploits the
black-box model of the ML-modules to learn the noise
patterns which can perform misclassification or confidence
reduction [20] [21], [22]. However, these learned noise
patterns can be visible [23] or imperceptible. For example,
the adversarial attacks are a prime example of impercepti-
ble attacks on ML-modules, i.e., limited-memory Broyden-
Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (L-BFGS) method [24], the fast
gradient sign method (FGSM) [17], [25], [26] method, the
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [6], etc. Sim-
ilarly, these attacks also require access to the inference data
acquisition block. Although adversarial examples perform
imperceptible security attacks, they posses the following
limitations:
a) Most of them require reference sample(s) from the
dataset.
b) The imperceptibility of such attacks can be identified
by applying the correlation coefficient and structural
similarity index-based testing.
The above mentioned-limitations of IDP raise the fundamental
research question: “How to introduce and generate simple yet
imperceptible attack noise pattern which can perform targeted
or untargeted misclassification while ensuring the correlation
coefficient and structural similarity index?”
B. Our Novel Contribution
To address the above-mentioned research challenges, in this
paper, we propose an iterative methodology, TrISec, to develop
an imperceptible attack which does not require any knowledge
of the training data samples and also incorporates the effects of
noise on correlation coefficient and structural similarity index.
In a nutshell, this paper contributes the following:
1) To ensure training dataset independence, we propose to use
the back-propagation algorithms on pre-trained DNNs.
2) To ensure imperceptibility, we propose a two-step method-
ology which first ensures the correlation which introduces
the randomness in attack noise and then ensures the struc-
tural similarity index to avoid high intensity noise at a
particular location.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed TriSec attack, we
evaluated it on the VGGNet, trained for the German Traffic
Sign Recognition Benchmarks (GTSRB) dataset [27]. Our
experimental results show that even while maintaining the
value of correlation coefficient and structural similarity index
around 1 and 0.999, respectively, the TriSec attack success-
fully misclassify the stop sign with almost 95% confidence.
Moreover, we also evaluated the perceptibility of the state-of-
the-art attacks and compare it with the porposed TriSec attack.
II. DATA SECURITY ATTACKS ON ML INFERENCING
In the manufacturing cycle of ML-driven systems, as with
the traditional systems, the inference stages of ML algorithms
come with security vulnerabilities, i.e., manipulation of the
data acquisition block, communication channels and side-
channel analysis to manipulate the inference data [28] [29].
Remote cyber-attacks and side-channel attacks come with high
computational costs so these are less frequently used [20] [30].
Therefore, to design/implement the Inference Data Poisoning
(IDP) attacks, we need to consider the following challenges:
1) How to relax the assumption of having the access to the
inference data acquisition block?
2) How to generate an attack noise pattern which is imper-
ceptible?
To address these research challenges, several imperceptible
IDPs have been proposed. However, adversarial attackls are
one of the most effective IDP attacks. Therefore, in this
section, we analyze a couple of the adversarial attacks,
i.e, limited memory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (L-
BFGS) and Fast Gradient Sign Method (FSGM).
A. L-BFGS Method
This method (proposed by Szegedy et al.) generates an
adversarialattack on DDNs [24], [31]. The basic principle of
the L-BFGS method is to iteratively optimize the reference
noise with respect to the sample image from dataset, as shown
in Equation 1.
min ||N ||2 =⇒ f(x+ noise) 6= f(x) (1)
Where, the minimization of the N represents the impercepti-
bility of this perturbation. To illustrate the effectiveness of this
method, we demonstrated this attack on the VGGNet trained
for the GTSRB, as shown in Fig. 4. This experimental analysis
shows that by introducing adversarial noise to the image, the
input is missclassified, i.e., from a stop sign to a speed limit
60km/h sign.
Although the L-BFGS method generates adversarial exam-
ples with imperceptible noise, it utilizes a basic linear search
algorithm to update the noise for optimization, which makes
it computationally expensive and slow.
B. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FSGM)
To address the above-mentioned limitation of L-BFG, Good-
fellow et al. proposed a Fast Gradient Sign Method to generate
adversarial attacks [25], [26]. FSGM is faster and requires less
computations because it performs one-step-gradient-update
algorithm along the direction of the sign of gradient at each
pixel. To demonstrate the effect of this attack, we implemented
it on the VGGNet trained for GTSRB, as shown in Fig. 4.
Our experimental results indicate that it can perform the
missclassifcation without any visible noise in the sample.
C. Limitations
Despite the above-mentioned attacks, there are many ad-
versarial attacks such as the basic iterative method (BIM);
the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [6], the one-
pixel attack [32], the DeepFool attack [33], the Zeroth Order
Optimization (ZOO) attack [34], the CPPN EA Fool [35], and
the C&W’s attack [36]. Though, most of these attacks generate
imperceptible noise patterns but they possess the following
limitations:
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Fig. 4: Experimental Analysis for L-BFGS and FGSM attacks on one
of the most advanced DNN, the VGGNet, trained for the German
Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmarks dataset.
1) Their optimization algorithm requires reference sample(s)
which limits their attack strength.
2) Their optimization algorithm does not consider the per-
ceptibly (maximizing correlation coefficient and structural
similarity index) in the optimization problem.
These limitation raise a research question: How can we gener-
ate an imperceptible inference data poisoning attack without
any reference sample(s).
III. TRISEC: TRAINING DATA-UNAWARE IMPERCEPTIBLE
ATTACK METHODOLOGY
To address the above-mentioned limitations of impercepti-
bility and dependency of training data samples, we propose an
attack, named “TrISec”, which leverages the back propagation
and gradient descent property of the DNNs to optimize the
perturbation in the attack images. We formulate the following
two goals to obtain the imperceptible attack:
1) The first goal (G1) is to generate the noise/perturbation
by achieving the targeted top 5 class probabilities, which
is done by computing and minimizing the cost function
(Equation 4) with respect to the targeted probabilities, as
formulated below:
G1 := {x =⇒ x+ δ : f(x+ δ) 6= f(x)} (2)
Where, f , x and δ represent the classification, input image,
generated noise/perturbation, respectively.
2) The second goal (G2) is to ensure the imperceptibility
of the generated perturbation/noise in the input image,
while maintaining the targeted top 5 class probabilities, as
formulated below:
G2 := {f(x+ δ) = y : CR(x, x+ δ) ≈ 1, SSI(x, x+ δ) ≈ 1} (3)
Where, CR(x, x + δ), SSI(x, x + δ) and y represent the
correlation coefficient, the structural similarity index and
targeted top 5 class probabilities, respectively.
A. Target Misclssification
To achieve the first goal (G1), i.e., ensure the target mis-
classification, we propose the following steps, as shown in
Fig. 5.
1) We choose a classification/prediction probability distribu-
tion of the targeted class (y) and compute the classifica-
tion/prediction probability distribution of the target image
(a(L)). To identify the difference between their respective
Deep Neural Network
Target Image Top 5 Class Probabilities
Cost 
Function
C ≤ 0
𝐶 = ෍
𝑗=0
𝑛𝐿−1
(𝑎𝑗
𝐿 − 𝑦𝑗)
2
Current 
Distribution
Targeted 
Distribution
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑎𝑗
(𝐿)
= 2 ෍
𝑗=0
𝑛𝐿−1
(𝑎𝑗
𝐿 − 𝑦𝑗)
Compute Correlation 
(CR)
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑎𝑗
(𝐿−1)
= ෍
𝑗=0
𝑛𝐿−1
𝑤𝑗𝑘
𝐿 𝜎′ 𝑧𝑗
𝑙+1 𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑎𝑗
(𝐿)
PASS
Compute the effect of cost (C) on 
activation function (a)
FAIL
Compute structural 
similarity index (SS)
0.95 ≤ 𝐶𝑅 ≤ 1
0.99 ≤ 𝑆𝑆 ≤ 1
Original 
Image
Attack 
Image
PASS FAIL
PASS
0
50
100
A B C D E
0
50
100
A B C D E
Targeted Class or 
Targeted Classification Probability
FAIL
𝛿 = 𝛿 × (1 − 𝐶𝑅)
𝛿 = 𝛿 × (1 − 𝑆𝑆)
Update 
Noise /
Perturbation 
(𝛿)
𝑎(𝐿)
𝑦
Fig. 5: Proposed Methodology, Training Data-Unware Imperceptible Security Attacks (TrISec) on Deep Neural Network (DNNs), which
automatically generates imperceptible attack images by using the back-propagation algorithm on pre-trained DNNs
prediction/classification probabilities, we compute the fol-
lowing cost function (C):
C =
nL−1∑
j=0
(a(L) − yj)2 (4)
Where, nL represents the total numbers of neuron in layer
(L) of particular DNN.
2) To achieve the target misclassification with higher confi-
dence, we minimize the cost function for classification by
iteratively comparing it with 0. If its value is greater than
zero then we back propagate this effect to the target image
by using the following set of equations.
For back propagating the cost function in last layer (L):
δC
δa(L)
= 2×
nL−1∑
j=0
(
a(L) − yj
)
(5)
For rest of the layers in DNNs:
δC
δa
(L−1)
j
=
nL−1∑
j=0
(
w
(L)
jk × σ′(z(L−1)j )×
δC
δa(L)
)
(6)
z
(L−1)
j =
nL−1∑
j=0
(
w
(L−1)
jk × a(L−1)j ×+bj
)
(7)
where, a and w(L−)jk are the output of the activation func-
tions, and the weights of the previous layer. To understand
the impact of the cost function on the activation function
and their corresponding outputs, we compute the inverse
effect of the Equations 5 and 6. We repeat this step until
the cost function is approximately equal to 0 to ensure the
target misclassification.
B. Imperceptibility
To achieve the second goal of imperceptibility (G2), we
propose a two step methodology, as shown in Fig 5.
1) After achieving the targeted misclassification, firstly, we
compute and compare the correlation coefficient (CR) of
the perturbed image with the desired correlation coefficient
(e.g., in our case, 0.95 ≥ CR ≤ 1), to measure the
imperceptibility. To maximize the CR and imperceptibility,
we propose to multiply the CR of the perturbed image to
current perturbation/noise, as shown in Equation 8.
δ = δ × CR(x, x+ δ) (8)
2) Although, the correlation coefficient somewhat ensures the
imperceptibility, it is only useful when there is a signif-
icant number of pixel changes. Therefore, we propose to
compute and compare the structural similarity index (SSI)
of the perturbed image to measure the imperceptibility.
To maximize the SSI and imperceptibility, we propose
to multiply the SSI of the perturbed image to current
perturbation/noise, as shown in Equation 9.
δ = δ × SSI(x, x+ δ) (9)
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed TrISec attack,
we evaluate it on the VGGNet trained for German Traffic Sign
Recognition Benchmarks and also compared it with state-of-
the-art adversarial attacks, i.e., FGSM and L-BFG, available
in the open-source Cleverhans library.
A. Experimental Setup
For this analysis, we use the following experimental setup:
1) DNN and Dataset: We use the VGGNet [37] trained for
German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmarks (GTSRB)
dataset [27].
2) Threat Model: As typical in the security community, we
assume that the attacker has complete access to the training
data samples and can also manipulate the trained neural
network.
B. Experimental Analysis
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method-
ology, we implemented this methodology on the VGGNet
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Fig. 6: Experimental results for proposed imperceptible security attack on the VGGNet, a DNN trained on GTSRB dataset. This analysis
shows that with the increase in iterations the attack noise become invisible, as depicted by the image sequences.
trained for the GTDRB with imperceptibility constraints (de-
fined as CR = 0.95 and SSI = 0.99). The experimental
results in Fig. 6 show how the imperceptibility is ensured with
respect to iterations. In this analysis, we identify the following
key observations:
1) After the first iteration, we achieve the targeted miscalssi-
fication but the intensity of the attack noise is very high
and is clearly visible in the images of Fig. 6 under the “I1”
label. Moreover, the corresponding values of CR and SSI
are 0.901 and 0.8133 which are below the defined bounds,
i.e., 0.95 and 0.99.
2) The top-5 accuracy values and the corresponding values of
CR and SSI are presented in the analysis graph of Fig. 6.
It shows that with an increase in imperceptibility, the attack
accuracy of the attack image and the corresponding values
of CR and SSI also increase.
C. Comparison with State-of-the-art Adversarial Attacks
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed attack, in
this section, we present a comparison with the state-of-the-art
adversarial attacks, i.e., FGSM and L-BFGS (available in the
open-source libarary “cleverhans”), on the VGGnet, trained for
the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmarks (GTSRB).
By analyzing the experimental results (See Fig. 7) for FGSM
and L-BFGS, we make the following key observations:
1) In FGSM, if the imperceptibility factor (IF) is “1” (which
represents attack noise being added without any scaling),
the misclassifcation goal is achieved but the correlation
coefficient and structural similarity index are “72.31%” and
“28.88%”, respectively. However, to reduce the effect of the
noise, if the imperceptibility factor is reduced until 0.01,
then the attack accuracy, correlation coefficient and struc-
tural similarity index increase. If we further decrease the
imperceptibility factor, the attack accuracy decreases expo-
nentially, as shown in Fig. 7. For example, for IF=0.001
and 0.0001, the FGSM fails but the correlation coefficient
and structural similarity index are “100%” and “99.699%”,
respectively. Similarly, this trend is also observed in case
of the L-BFGS attack.
2) On the other hand, the proposed TrISec attack incorporates
the effect of imperceptibility (i.e., correlation coefficient
and structural similarity index) in its optimization goal (See
Equations, 2 and 3). Therefore, it does not require any
imperceptibility factor and generates a successful attack
noise while maximizing the correlation coefficient and
structural similarity index, as shown in Fig. 6.
D. Key Insights
1) Instead of using the reference image from the training
dataset to generate the imperceptible attack noise, the
prediction / classification probability distribution of the
targeted class can be used to generate the imperceptible
noise/perturbation, as shown in Fig. 6.
2) To ensure the maximum imperceptibility, ideally the at-
tacker should only rely on one parameter. For example, in
our experimental analysis, after 25 iterations the CR value
is greater then the defined bound (0.95) but the noise is
not imperceptible, as shown in Fig. 6.
3) Unlike th traditional adversarial attacks, the impercepti-
bility parameters, especially, the correlation co-efficient
and structural similarity index, must be included in the
optimization problem to generate a successful and imper-
ceptible attack during inference.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel training-data unaware
methodology to automatically generate an imperceptible ad-
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Fig. 7: Experimental analysis of the state-of-the-art adversarial attacks, i.e., FGSM, L-BFGS. This analysis shows that impact of the
imperceptibility factor on the attack accuracy (confidence of the targeted class). Imperceptibility factor is defined as the parameter to reduce
the impact of the attack noise on the correlation and structural tests. CR and SSI represent the correlation co-efficient and structural similarity
index, respectively.
versarial attack by using the back-propagation algorithm on
pre-trained deep neural networks (DNN). We successfully
demonstrated the attack on an advanced deep neural network,
the VGGNet, deployed in an autonomous driving use-case for
traffic sign detection. The VGGNet is trained for the German
Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmarks (GTSRB) datasets. Our
experiments showed that the generated attacks go unnoticed
in both subjective and objective tests, with close to 100%
correlation and structural similarity index with respect to
the clean input image. Our study shows that such attacks
can be very powerful and would require new security-aware
design methods for developing robust machine learning-based
systems for autonomous vehicles.
REFERENCES
[1] P. Bansal et al., “Forecasting americans long-term adoption of connected
and autonomous vehicle technologies,” Transportation Research Part A:
Policy and Practice, vol. 95, pp. 49–63, 2017.
[2] D. Lund et al., “Worldwide and regional internet of things (iot) 2014–
2020 forecast: A virtuous circle of proven value and demand,” Interna-
tional Data Corporation (IDC), Tech. Rep, vol. 1, 2014.
[3] M. Shafique et al., “An overview of next-generation architectures for
machine learning: Roadmap, opportunities and challenges in the IoT
era,” in DATE. IEEE, 2018, pp. 827–832.
[4] M. Bojarski et al., “End to end learning for self-driving cars,”
arXiv:1604.07316, 2016.
[5] I. Goodfellow et al., “Generative adversarial nets,” in NIPS, 2014, pp.
2672–2680.
[6] N. Papernot et al., “The limitations of deep learning in adversarial
settings,” in EuroS&P. IEEE, 2016, pp. 372–387.
[7] J. Steinhardt et al., “Certified defenses for data poisoning attacks,” in
NIPS, 2017, pp. 3520–3532.
[8] F. M. Favaro` et al., “Examining accident reports involving autonomous
vehicles in california,” PLoS one, vol. 12, no. 9, p. e0184952, 2017.
[9] N. Papernot et al., “SoK: Security and privacy in machine learning,” in
EuroS&P. IEEE, 2018, pp. 399–414.
[10] M. Zhao et al., “Data poisoning attacks on multi-task relationship
learning,” in AAAI, 2018, pp. 2628–2635.
[11] Y. Wang et al., “Data poisoning attacks against online learning,”
arXiv:1808.08994, 2018.
[12] A. Shafahi et al., “Poison frogs! targeted clean-label poisoning attacks
on neural networks,” arXiv:1804.00792, 2018.
[13] L. Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al., “Towards poisoning of deep learning algo-
rithms with back-gradient optimization,” in AIS. ACM, 2017, pp. 27–38.
[14] M. Zou et al, “Potrojan: powerful neural-level trojan designs in deep
learning models,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.03043, 2018.
[15] I. Rosenberg et al., “Generic black-box end-to-end attack against rnns
and other api calls based malware classifiers,” arXiv:1707.05970, 2017.
[16] N. Paperno at al., “Towards the science of security and privacy in
machine learning,” arXiv:1611.03814, 2016.
[17] A. Kurakin et al., “Adversarial examples in the physical world,”
arXiv:1607.02533, 2016.
[18] F. Khalid et al., “Security for machine learning-based systems: At-
tacks and challenges during training and inference,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1811.01463, 2018.
[19] M. Jagielski et al., “Manipulating machine learning: Poisoning attacks
and countermeasures for regression learning,” arXiv:1804.00308, 2018.
[20] N. Papernot et al., “Practical black-box attacks against machine learn-
ing,” in AsiaCCS. ACM, 2017, pp. 506–519.
[21] ——, “CleverHans v2. 0.0: an adversarial machine learning library,”
arXiv:1610.00768, 2016.
[22] F. Khalid et al., “Fademl: Understanding the impact of pre-processing
noise filtering on adversarial machine learning,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1811.01444, 2018.
[23] T. Gu et al., “Badnets: Identifying vulnerabilities in the machine learning
model supply chain,” arXiv:1708.06733, 2017.
[24] C. Szegedy et al., “Intriguing properties of neural networks,”
arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
[25] A. Rozsa et al., “Adversarial diversity and hard positive generation,” in
CVPR Workshop. IEEE, 2016, pp. 25–32.
[26] I. Goodfellow et al., “Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples,”
stat, vol. 1050, p. 20, 2015.
[27] J. Stallkamp et al., “The German traffic sign recognition benchmark:
a multi-class classification competition,” in IJCNN. IEEE, 2011, pp.
1453–1460.
[28] Y. Vorobeychik et al., “Adversarial machine learning,” Synthesis Lectures
on AI and ML, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 1–169, 2018.
[29] A. D. J. et al., Adversarial Machine Learning. Cambridge University
Press, 2018.
[30] R. Shokri et al., “Membership inference attacks against machine learning
models,” in S&P. IEEE, 2017, pp. 3–18.
[31] P. Tabacof et al., “Exploring the space of adversarial images,” in IJCNN.
IEEE, 2016, pp. 426–433.
[32] J. Su et al., “One pixel attack for fooling deep neural networks,”
arXiv:1710.08864, 2017.
[33] S. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., “Deepfool: a simple and accurate method to
fool deep neural networks,” in CVPR. IEEE, 2016, pp. 2574–2582.
[34] P. Chen et al., “Zoo: Zeroth order optimization based black-box attacks
to deep neural networks without training substitute models,” in AISec.
ACM, 2017, pp. 15–26.
[35] A. Nguyen et al., “Deep neural networks are easily fooled: High
confidence predictions for unrecognizable images,” in CVPR. IEEE,
2015, pp. 427–436.
[36] N. Carlini et al., “Towards evaluating the robustness of neural networks,”
in S&P. IEEE, 2017, pp. 39–57.
[37] L. Wang et al., “Places205-VGGNet Models for scene recognition,”
arXiv:1508.01667, 2015.
